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The purpose of this thesis is to assess U.S. policies
favoring the passing and implementing the Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) and its impact on cooperative
security in the Western Hemisphere.  Similar to the 1990s,
when the U.S. government debated the pros and cons of the
NAFTA, the United States now faces a debate over passage
and implementation of the FTAA.  
With many U.S. and Latin American citizens’ focus on
economic domestic issues, FTAA talks have been widely
contested among non-governmental organizations,
governmental organizations, labor and social groups, and
the legislative and executive branches of the United States
and Latin American governments.  
This thesis argues that economic policies can
influence security policies for economically integrated
countries and lead to greater regional cooperation on
security.  The increasing level of transnational threats,
pressure from new actors in favor of establishing
stability, and the weakening state role stemming from the
free market environment and democratic reform encourages a
spillover effect in establishing more coordinated security
strategies for the threats associated with economic
integration.  Therefore, economic integration can lead to
lead to greater cooperation on security and I argue that
the United States and Latin America should pass and
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1
I. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this thesis is to assess U.S. policies
favoring the passage and implementation of the Free Trade
of the Americas (FTAA) and its impact on cooperative
security in the Western Hemisphere.  An example of this
type of impact on cooperative security can be seen with the
fifteen European countries that make up the European Union. 
These countries have entered into a new era of economic
adjustment, integration, and cooperation.  Additionally,
with the passage of Mercosur in 1991, Argentina, Uruguay,
Paraguay, and Brazil have also established their own free
trade zone, and lowered barriers to the free flow of goods
among them and have cooperated greater on security issues.    
During the mid-20th century, Latin American countries
pursued protective, mercantilist economic policies for one
another.  During the last 25 years, trade liberalization
and economic integration have helped these countries
increase trade and investment abroad.  For example,
Mercosur countries have increased their net foreign direct
investment (FDI) by more than 400% since its passage in
1991.1  These states also have improved their political
relationships.  Political theorist Augusto Varas argues
that these countries have laid aside age-old rivalries and
mutual suspicions in favor of mutual economic and political
cooperation.2  The question I analyze is whether there is
any spillover effect in other areas, such as cooperative
                    
1 Patrice M. Franko, Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas: The
Strategic Implications of the FTAA (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2000), 17.
2 Augusto Varas, “La pos-guerra fria, la seguridad hemisferica y la defensa
nacional,” in Agusto Varas and Cruz Johnson, eds., Percepciones de Amenza y
Politica de Defensa en America Latina (Santiago: FLASCO, 1993), 1-69.
2
security.  Specifically, can the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) lead to enhanced security cooperation for
the United States and Latin American for the containment of
the transnational threats of terrorism, drug interdiction,
illegal migration, and domestic crime? 
A. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Similarly to the 1990s, when the U.S. government
debated the pros and cons of participating in NAFTA, the
United States now faces a debate over passage and
implementation of the FTAA.  The FTAA is a proposed free
trade area that would involve nearly 800 million people
across 34 democratic countries in the Western Hemisphere. 
All countries would be represented except Cuba, which still
maintains a socialist government.  If implemented, this
trade agreement could lead to more choices of goods and
inputs, a more competitive business environment, lower
prices, and possibly greater cooperation on security and
defense issues throughout the Western Hemisphere. 
Negotiations for the FTAA are still taking place.  Canada,
Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil, and the United States lead the
negotiations.  These five countries rotate the chair every
18 months.  The paired chairmanship of the United States
and Brazil in the final scheduled stage set to start in
January 2003 is designed to address the divergent
political, economic, and social priorities of the two most
influential countries in the Western Hemisphere.3  
Due to recent economic and political events in the
Western Hemisphere, controversy over the FTAA has increased
                    
3 Ambassador Peter F. Allgeir, Associate U.S. Trade Representative for the
Western Hemisphere, “The Importance of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) to United States Foreign Policy,” statement before the Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations House of
Representatives, 12 July 2001. 
3
dramatically in recent months.  With the focus of many U.S. 
and Latin American citizens on domestic issues (the
economy, inflation, unemployment, etc.), FTAA talks have
been widely contested among non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), governmental organizations, labor and social
groups, and the legislative and executive branches of the
United States and Latin American governments.  
Many U.S. and Latin American citizens are fearful of
the FTAA and the effects of trade liberalization.  Many
small business owners, labor unions, and social groups feel
that the United States and the Latin American countries
should focus on their respective domestic economic and
social problems before agreeing to the FTAA, which could
cause dramatic rises in inflation, drops in real wages, and
increased unemployment in the United States and Latin
America.4 In addition, many Latin Americans farmers and
trade unions are fearful of a U.S.-backed hemispheric free
trade agreement that would only promote American priorities
and goals in the region and damage their living standards
and way of life.5  They argue that bilateral free trade
agreements with the United States is the only viable option
available to ensure their country’s priorities and goals
are met.  
Supporters (multinational corporations, foreign
investors, industrial leaders, etc.) of the FTAA highlight
the positive economic results (increased foreign direct
investment, gross domestic product, number of exports,
etc.) stemming from free trade areas, such as the European
                    
4 Richard E. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas: A Progress Report
(Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 131-138. 
5 Anthony Faiola, “Pressing for a Trade Pact,” Washington Post, 19 November
2002, E01. 
4
Union and Mercosur.6  These corporations, eager to expand in
Latin America, envision even greater economic growth and
interdependence with the FTAA, which could lead to a
spillover effect in other political objectives, such as
improved regional security.      
B. POLICY PROPOSAL
The mutual economic gains brought by the respective
free trade agreements of the European Union and Mercosur
are centripetal forces pulling states to greater
cooperation, not only economically and politically, but
also in security.  With economic integration and
interdependence stemming from these free trade areas,
greater cooperation on confronting and combating
transnational issues such as drug interdiction, illegal
migration, terrorism, domestic crime, and social violence
have led to greater collective security.  Through the
Maastricht Treaty and Latin American permanent security
commissions on drug control and antiterrorist activities,
countries in the European Union and Mercosur have
established joint and coordinated security strategies deal
with the increased transnational threats associated with
trade liberalization.7
This thesis argues that economic policies can
influence security policies for economically integrated
countries and lead to greater cooperation on regional
security because of spillover effects.  Spillover occurs
when a joint action in one area creates new needs,
                    
6 Ibid., E01.
7 Dick Leonard, Guide to the European Community: The Original and Definitive
Guide to All Aspects of the European Community (London: Bath Press, 1992), 216;
and David Pion-Berlin, “Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional
Security in the Southern Cone,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World
Affairs 42, no. 1, 54.
5
tensions, problems, and issues that increase the pressure
to take joint action in other areas.8  
The increasing level of transnational threats,
pressure from new actors for stability, and the weakening
state role stemming from the free market environment and
democratic reform leads to a policy spillover in
establishing more coordinated and joint strategies for the
issues of drug trafficking, illegal migration, and
terrorism associated with economic integration.  However,
for spillover to occur in cooperative security, three
conditions must be present.  First, there must be no major
conflict and/or dispute among the countries involved in the
free trade area.  Second, democratic governments must be in
place, and no authoritarian regimes among the trading
partners.  Third, there must be a strong desire by the
regional hegemonic power(s) for greater cooperation on
security.  Absent any of these conditions, spillover will
not occur.  
Due to integration, countries can no longer handle
these threats in isolation.  Multilateral solutions are
needed.  As seen through the European Union and in
Mercosur, these member states are working more closely
together to handle these threats with joint and coordinated
foreign and security policies.  Thus, this spillover effect
leads to greater cooperation among economically integrated
member states and can lead to greater regional security.
With the FTAA, economic integration can have a spillover
effect in political issues and lead to greater cooperation
                    
8 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction
(New York: Palgrave, 1999), 12-20.
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on security between the United States and Latin America in
combating transnational threats. 
C. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will focus between the years of 1950 to
the present-day.  With the rise of economic integration
agreements, free-market oriented reforms and
democratization sweeping the world during this timeframe,
this thesis will show that regional economic integration
has led to a spillover effect in other foreign policy
issues, such as security. Chapter II examines the
theoretical expectations of spillover and how economic
integration can enhance regional security cooperation.  It
examines various explanations of regional security
cooperation as a result of economic integration. Chapter
III describes how economic integration in the European
Union and Mercosur has led to greater regional security
cooperation.  Chapter IV evaluates Latin American reactions
toward economic integration with the FTAA and regional
security cooperation.  Special emphasis is placed on
Brazil’s view of the FTAA.  Chapter V analyzes the
positions of domestic U.S. groups supportive and opposed to
the FTAA.  Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the thesis
and explains why the United States should pass and
implement the FTAA.  
7
II. IDEAS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
A. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
With the passage of Mercosur in 1991, Argentina,
Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, and Bolivia entered a new
era of economic adjustment, cooperation, and integration. 
Similar results can be seen in Europe with the increasing
economic and political integration of the 15 European Union
states. 
Some political scientists believe that economic
integration and cooperation on security are unrelated
conditions.  Observers such David Pion-Berlin, Monica
Hirst, and Maria da Conceicao feel that improvements in
regional confidence within multilateral institutions
dealing with security concerns are independent of progress
towards economic integration and a free trade agreement. 
These political scientists feel that through improved
diplomacy and political ties only, greater cooperation was
seen in other political areas, such as security.9 
Other political scientists, such as Augusto Varas and
Jorge I. Dominguez believe that free trade agreements and
economic integration can lead to greater cooperation on
security.  Through the effects of spillover, economic
integration has lead to greater regional security in free
trade areas such as the European Union and Mercosur.  As
mentioned earlier, spillover occurs when a joint action in
one area creates new needs, tensions, problems, and issues
                    
9 Proponents of this argument include Pion-Berlin, “Will Soldiers Follow?”; 
E. Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining:
Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1996);  and Monica Hirst and Maria da Conceicao Tavares,
Argentina-Brasil: el largo camino de la integracion (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Legasa, 1988).   
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that increase the pressure to take joint action in other
areas. The factors of the increased level of transnational
threats, pressure from new actors for stability, and the
weakening state role resulting from the free market
environment and democratic reform leads to the process of
spillover. However, for spillover to occur in security
relations, three conditions must be met. 
First, there must be no major conflict/dispute among
the countries involved in the free trade area. 
Antagonistic feelings will hamper spillover effects in
political issues, such as security.  Second, democratic
governments must be in place by all member-states. 
Authoritarian regimes will not fully support the
integration process and spillover will not occur.  Third,
there must be a strong desire by the perceived hegemonic
power(s) in the trading area for greater cooperation on
security.  A country or countries cannot just desire
economic benefits from trade liberalization.  It must
desire cooperation on other policy issues, such as
security.  All of these conditions must be present for
spillover to occur in greater cooperation on security
policies.  
As the European Union and Merscour state markets have
become more intertwined and interdependent, these three
conditions are present and have led to an increase in joint
and coordinated security strategies for the containment of
the issues of drug trafficking, illegal migration, and
terrorism associated with trade liberalization.  Through
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these conditions, economic integration can lead to greater
cooperative security.10   
B. WAYS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
There are three basic ways that economic integration
can encourage security cooperation.  First, because
increasing economic integration can increase transnational
threats, these security problems can only be solved through
multilateral action.  Countries do not have the resources
necessary to effectively combat the growing number of drug
traffickers, illegal aliens, and terrorists unilaterally,
anymore.  Multilateral solutions are needed.   
Second, economic integration and free trade can
empower new actors (e.g., foreign investors, multinational
corporations, industrial leaders, business elites, etc.)
who place demands on the state for multilateral solutions
to combat transnational threats.  To ensure their
investment is not wasted due to social violence, these new
actors force state leaders to put stability and security at
the top of national priorities or face the possibility of
reduced foreign investment in their country.  
Third, due to the change in economic philosophy, the
state’s role is weakened.  State-centered policies have
been abandoned and new policies have been adopted that
favor privatization and the attraction of foreign and
domestic investors.  This has left inadequate state
resources, such as equipment, technology, and personnel, to
combat the transnational threats associated with trade
                    
10 Proponents of this argument include Augusto Varas, “La pos-guerra fria,
la seguridad hemisferica y la defensa nacional,” 1-69 and Jorge I. Dominguez,
International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the
Post-Cold War Era (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1998), 3-28.
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liberalization.  We will first examine the theory of the
increased levels of transnational threats.  
C. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS 
With economic integration and free trade, there is
more transparency among states.  With the free flow of
goods, capital, resources, and people, states’ economic
policies are tied more closely together with their fellow
trading bloc partners in the free trade area.  As markets
become more integrated, causing individual governments to
lose control of their own economic policies, the fortunes
of a state become increasingly exposed to the volatility of
markets and events beyond its geographical borders.11  This
forces state leaders to work with other state leaders to
come up with multilateral solutions to combat the
increasing level of transnational threats associated with
free trade.  Economic integration forces countries to
cooperate greater on security to ensure the peace and
stability needed for a free trade area to thrive.  Augusto
Varas has postulated that free trade generates the inter-
governmental momentum needed to enhance greater cooperation
on security issues among these countries.  He argues: 
As markets become more integrated, causing
governments to lose control over their own
economic destinies, the fortunes of a state
become increasingly tied to trading and
investment partners beyond its borders.  To
ensure its continued development, a state must
not only learn to foster greater transparency in
its economic relations with its neighbors, but
its military must do as well.12  
Due to fact that these countries’ economic policies
have become so intertwined and their budgets reduced, the
                    
11 Pion-Berlin, “Will Soldiers Follow?,” 47.  
12 Varas, “La pos-guerra fria,” 1-69. 
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countries’ militaries must shift in the same direction and
behave in ways that support a peaceful coexistence with
each other and to combat transnational threats jointly.  
Robert Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Luis Jorge
Garay have observed, “countries have used regional economic
integration to mutually cement their new democratic systems
and to create interdependencies which reduce interest in
pursuing historical rivalries and promote regional
cooperation in areas other than trade.”13  Economist Jeffrey
J. Schott states that economic integration and improved
trade relations “can act as a magnet for attracting support
among our hemispheric neighbors for other important U.S.
political and foreign policy goals, including cooperation
on drug interdiction, improving environmental and labor
conditions, and reinforcing democratic reforms.”14  
This is seen in the European Union where member states
have established common measures on visas, immigration,
extradition and political asylum to combat the growing
number of terrorists crossing national borders and
affecting the stability in the region.  With regional
economic integration and free trade areas erasing
geographical borders, state leaders have been forced to
improve their intergovernmental relationships with each
other and cooperate more closely to form broader
partnerships in combating the region’s transnational issues
                    
13 Rober Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Luis Jorge Garay, “The FTAA: 
Some Longer Term Issues” paper prepared for the seminar FTAA and MERCOSUR: The
Brazilian Economy and Subregional and Hemispheric Integration Brasilia, 5-6
October 1998.   
14 Jeffrey J. Schott, “The Free Trade Area of the Americas: US Interests and
Objectives,” statement before the Subcommittee on Trade, House Committee on
Ways and Means, 22 July 1997, 4.
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that cross national boundaries that adversely affect the
economic well-being of states.  
D. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE ROLE OF NEW ACTORS 
A given state will support a regional proposal that
satisfies its own national goals and policies better, or at
a lower cost than an alternative unilateral or bilateral
proposal, through a simple calculation of a cost/benefit
analysis.  This cost/benefit analysis includes all factors:
political, economic, and social.  It also is influenced by
external and internal actors.15  Although external and
internal actors may not directly participate in the
regional economic integration negotiations, they indirectly
have an impact on the pattern of regional cooperation by
affecting the cost/benefit analysis of each state.16  With
regional economic integration and free trade areas, these
free-market based actors and institutions have an
instrument of power – the ability to exclude.  Foreign
investors and multilateral corporations will not invest
resources and capital into a country if they perceive
instability in the state.  They will exclude that country
from foreign investment and reaping economic benefits from
free trade.  
These actors are likely to have an impact on the
pattern of regional cooperation by directly affecting the
total costs and benefits of cooperation and by indirectly
affecting the perceived costs for each member state.
Examples of these costs include stability within the
region, access to crucial resources, and preservation of
investment opportunities.  Through these factors, these
                    
15 W. Andrew Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation (London:
Pinter Publishers, 1994), 23. 
16 Ibid., 25.
13
actors can influence states’ decision-making in political
matters such as security.      
As theorized by Patrice Franko, the possible threat of
exclusion from the free market environment has introduced a
new set of checks and balances in state decision and
policymaking.  Bad economics, poorly construed politics and
state institutions, and a perceived lack of stability and
security in a country can lead foreign investors and their
investment from investing from their state into investing
in another state.17  This is a cost/benefit analysis that
almost all foreign and domestic investors and businesses
perform before investing capital and resources into a
specific region or country.  These external and internal
actors (foreign investors, multinational corporations,
business elites, industrial leaders, etc.) demand certain
requirements from state leaders to ensure the protection of
their investment.  Some of these requirements include
access to crucial resources and industries, basic rule of
law, and economic and political security for its citizens.  
States that fail to control these transnational issues
can face enormous economic and social challenges18.  Due to
actors’ perceptions, these states face the prospect of
being excluded from the regional free-market economy. 
Thus, these new actors have forced state leaders to work
more closely with each other and cooperate greater on
regional security to come up with multilateral solutions to
ensure the stability and security required for a free-
market environment.   

                    
17 Franko, Toward a New Security Architecture, 20.
18 Axline, The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation, 25.
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E. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE WEAKENING STATE ROLE 
Due to weak state institutions, growing pains as they
move to the free-market environment, and a lack of a
coherent government apparatus to handle the transnational
issues associated with integration, a majority of
developing states have less effective in dealing with the
increasing domestic and international conflict arising from
social violence and transnational threats, such as drug-
trafficking, terrorism, and immigration.19  Due to the focus
on liberalization, some state resources have been diverted
from security and defense expenditures to domestic and
foreign business investments.  For example, between the
years of 1985 through 1995, the majority of Latin American
countries transforming to a free-market economy, have seen
the number of their military personnel stay the same or
reduced.  With the exceptions of Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico,
and Venezuela, the numbers of the armed forces have been
reduced or have remained relatively the same in Latin
America despite the increase in population growth in most
of these countries.20  Franko argues that this is in
response to economic integration where there is
increasingly weak state presence and resources for former
strategic, security, and defense sectors and more
investment in the development of financing institutions
(development banks and corporations, etc.).21  This leads to
countries slowly letting sovereignty slip away.  States are
no longer able to control threats within their borders. 
The only way to get a handle on combating these threats is
through international cooperative arrangements.  
                    




Traditionally, the military had performed the major
role in combating external and internal threats to the
state.  With the overall reduction in state outlays and
military personnel and their inability to control growing
transnational issues, many private organizations,
businesses, and elites have banded together throughout the
region to hire private security forces as bodyguards,
building attendants, and neighborhood police forces.  As
the state has shrunk, the rise of private and legal and
illegal power has created an environment where a select
group of people have the majority of the political and
social power and the respective state lacks the strong
institutional framework to address these transnational
threats.22  This has forced state leaders to come up with
multilateral solutions to combat transnational threats to
ensure the stability and security needed for economic
integration.
Security problems can no longer be solved in
isolation.  With economic integration, all countries are
now interdependent with each other.  To confront these
threats, countries must develop new channels of interaction
within their own governmental agencies and with those of
their regional partners.  As summarized by political
scientist Georges Fauriol of the possibilities of the FTAA, 
Some readers may be skeptical of the kinds of
inter-American linkages argued here.  Critics
might question the logic of integrating the
evolving South American defense considerations
into an already complex FTAA process.  The study
argues that the achievement cannot be limited
only to a simple set of trade negotiations…With
the end of the Cold War, international security
structures are now accompanied by an unequivocal
                    
22 Ibid., 26. 
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call for the ideals of democratic governance. 
From the political and security suspicions of the
past, acrimonious foreign policy clashes, and the
occasionally anxious economic relations, a new
spirit of partnership has emerged.  The Western
Hemisphere now entering the 21st century is truly
changed-a testimony to the positive results of
rebuilding relationships on the basis of
cooperation and trust.23
Due to the increase of transnational threats,
pressures from domestic and foreign actors, and the states’
weakening roles through integration, countries are now
working more frequently and closely together on issues such
as immigration, social violence, and political asylum to
ensure the peace and stability a free trade area needs to
have to thrive.  As a result, these factors of integration
lead to the spillover process in establishing greater
cooperative security among member states in a free trade
area.  
However, until all three conditions (no major
conflict/dispute among the countries involved in the free
trade area, democratic governments in place, and strong
desire by the regional hegemonic powers for greater
cooperative security) of spillover are met, economic
integration alone will result in cooperative security. 
Without any one of these variables, spillover will not
occur.  Through this, economic integration can lead to
greater cooperative security.     
   
                    
23 Georges A. Fauriol and William Perry, Thinking Strategically about 2005:
The United States and South America (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2000), 20.  
17
III.REGIONAL CASE STUDIES
Theorists such as David Pion-Berlin, Maria da
Conceicao Tavares, and E. Solingen have argued that
national interests alone dictate security policies.  With
democratic reform, states used diplomacy rather than threat
and saw more easily the potential advantages of cooperation
over conflict.24  
Other political scientists, such as Augusto Varas and
Jorge I. Dominguez have emphasized economic integration can
encourage greater interdependence and cooperation.  As
countries become more integrated, causing governments to
lose control over their own economic destinies, the
fortunes of the state become increasingly tied to its
trading and investment partners.  To continue to reap
economic benefits, countries must learn to foster greater
cooperation not only economically but in security as well.25  
The factors of the increasing level of transnational
threats, pressure from new actors for stability, and the
weakening state role stemming from the free market
environment and democratic reform leads to the process of
spillover in enhanced regional security.  However, as
mentioned earlier, for spillover to occur, three conditions
must be met; no major conflict/dispute among the members,
democratic governments in place, and strong desire by the
hegemonic power for greater cooperative security.  With the
absence of any of these conditions, spillover will not
occur.     
                    
24 Pion-Berlin, “Will Soldiers Follow?,” 45; E. Solingen, Industrial Policy;
and Hirst and Tavares, Argentina-Brasil.
25 Varas, “La pos-guerra fria, la seguridad hemisferica y la defensa
nacional,” 1-69 and Dominguez, International Security and Democracy, 3-28.
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Two regional case studies, the European Union and
Mercosur, illustrate this linkage between economic
integration and enhanced security cooperation. 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The origins of the European Union can be traced back
to the conclusion of World War II.  Before being liberated
by the Allies from the German government, the governments
of three countries-the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Luxembourg-decided in 1944 that their economic futures were
inextricably intertwined and formed the Benelux Union.26  
With the Benelux Union, other countries began to
realize that their economic futures were also intertwined. 
Any action or event in one country would have a spillover
effect in their country.  In fact, in 1950, Jean Monet, a
prominent French government economist, theorized that if
France and West Germany could settle their differences over
the iron and coal industries by a joint committee made up
of officials from both countries, both would be able to
regulate the war-making ability in each country.  With
this, both countries realized that their economic futures
were intertwined.  It was better to cooperate and reap
greater economic benefits than to oppose each other and
lose valuable resources and capital.  
This theory eventually evolved into the Schuman Plan,
named after French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman who
worked closely with Monet and who proposed the plan to the
French and West German governments.  This plan called for
the West German and French coal and steel industries placed
under a single committee of West German and French
                    
26 Leonard, Guide to the European Community, 3.
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officials, which would supervise its policy and
development.  Schuman theorized that, 
The pooling of coal and steel production should
immediately provide for the setting up of common
foundations for economic development as a first
step in the federation of Europe, and will change
the destinies of those regions which have long
been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of
war, of which they have been the most constant
victims.  The solidarity between the two
countries established by joint production will
show that a war between France and Germany
becomes not only unthinkable but materially
impossible.  The setting up of this powerful
productive unit, open to all countries willing to
take part and bound immediately to provide all
the member countries with the basic elements of
industrial production on the same terms, will lay
a foundation for their economic unification.27  
Other European countries also began to see that their
economic futures were also intertwined and began to look
for ways for integration.  
B. THE TREATY OF ROME 
The Treaty of Rome, signed on 25 March 1957, became
the backbone of European economic integration.  The central
feature of the treaty was the establishment of a common
market among its member states, known as the European
Economic Community (EEC).28  This economic integration would
spread to nine other European countries over the next four
decades and would become the modern-day European Union, a
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C. THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE
With the emergence of the European Union’s global
economic power in the last 40 years, government observers
raised questions about the possibility of a spillover
effect into other areas, such as security policies.  With
economic integration and free trade, there are more border-
less divisions between countries with the free flow of
people, services, capital, and trade traveling from one
country to another. Accompanying this free flow of trade
are the associated transnational threats of drug
trafficking, terrorism, and illegal migration.  With free
trade, the level of these transnational threats was
becoming so high that individual countries did not have the
resources necessary to combat and contain these issues in
isolation anymore.  To continue to reap economic benefits
stemming from integration and free trade, countries
realized that these threats could only be tackled
multilaterally.29 
Additionally, during this time-period, a majority of
the European countries were replacing their authoritarian
governments with a more liberal democratic system and
shifting their economic policies from an isolationist and
protectionist model to a more open, free-market
environment.  With this, the demand for foreign direct
investment was increasing dramatically.  These new actors
(foreign investors, multinational corporations, business
elites, etc.) were forcing state leaders to place stability
and security at the top of their national priorities.  With
the transition to the free market and the diversion of
state resources from security and defense matters to the
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attraction of FDI, states were forced to cooperate greater
with each other to combat these threats to ensure not being
excluded from the free trade environment.30  To formally
address these threats, a joint and coordinated security
policy was needed.  After years of heated political debate
amongst the European nations, the Maastrict Treaty was
signed in February 1992 and the European Union’s joint
foreign, security, and defense policies was established.
1. The Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty is based upon three pillars. 
The first pillar consists of the three existing
organizations-the EC, ECSC, and Euratom-that was originally
established by the Treaty of Rome.  In the first pillar,
the Member States agreed to transfer economic decision-
making powers to the European Union Commission, the Council
of Ministers, European Parliament (EP), and the European
Court of Justice (ECJ).  In addition, specific guidance and
recommendations on selected issues were to come from the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Central
Bank (ECB).31  
The second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), is based upon the previous European
Political Cooperation originally established in the early
1950s.  The CFSP is based upon five very general
objectives: safeguarding the common values and interests of
the Union; strengthening its security; preserving its peace
and strengthening international security in accordance with
the principles of the United Nations charter; promoting
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international cooperation; and developing and consolidating
democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.32  Decision-making in the second
pillar is to be largely intergovernmental, but each member
state is given co-equal right to make security
recommendations and proposals to the Union.  In addition,
the EU members defined the objectives of the CFSP by
establishing a “systematic cooperation” in the field of
foreign policy and by adopting joint actions in areas of
common interest.  The Maastricht Treaty also stipulated
that the CFSP “shall include all questions related to the
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a
common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common
defense.”33  However, this was still a vague objective
viewed differently by every Member State.  Eventually, in
response to this vagueness, all members of the European
Union signed the Treaty of Amsterdam in October 1997 to
clarify specific defense and security issues. 
2. The Treaty of Amsterdam
This treaty specifically stated that the European
Council was empowered to decide the progressive framing of
a common defense policy, in which all member states would
have to adopt “in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements.”34  By agreeing to this, all
member states of the European Union agreed to participate
as necessary in military actions relating to humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management or
peacemaking operations.   
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Additionally, to combat the ever-increasing
transnational threats of drug trafficking, terrorism, and
illegal migration associated with economic integration and
free trade, member states realized that greater security
cooperation was needed to confront these issues.  Thus, the
third pillar to the Maastricht Treaty was established.  Due
to the completion of the single market and abolition of
control on the movement of goods, people, services and
capital established by the first pillar, the third pillar
established greater cooperation among the member states to
confront transnational threats.  Supporters of this pillar
argued that international crime syndicates and drug
traffickers had adjusted to the single market environment
while their respective country’s government had not.  Crime
syndicates, drug traffickers, and illegal aliens were
crossing geographical borders and increasing the amount of
social violence and instability in all countries of the
European Union.  At the same time, due to diminished state
resources, governments had not adjusted to the free trade
environment.  Through extensive negotiations and
compromises, the member states committed themselves to
better cooperation and collaboration in combating these
threats.35  This included greater cooperation in the fields
of justice and domestic affairs, including asylum policy,
control of external borders and immigration from outside
the European Union, and combating drug trafficking and
addiction, and international crime.  Member States also
agreed to establish the European Police Office (Europol) to
jointly share information, people, and resources among all
countries to better confront and combat the transnational
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threats associated with free trade and economic
integration.36  
With these three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty and
the reforms made in the Amsterdam Treaty, the present-day
European Union was established.  Member states, realizing
that economic integration and trade liberalization brought
an increase of transnational threats, demands of new actors
for stability, and weakened state’s role, established
avenues of greater transparency not only economically but
in political issues as well.  A spillover effect is seen in
the fields of foreign, security, and defense policies.
Through this case, we can see the effects of economic
policy influencing security policy. 
D. SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN EUROPEN UNION
Economic integration leads to a spillover effect in
security policies in the European Union.  However, in order
for this spillover to occur, the three conditions of no
major dispute/conflict among the trading partners,
democratic regimes in place, and strong desire by the
hegemonic powers for greater cooperative security had to be
met.  They are.  We will examine the condition of no major
disputes among the members first.
All the countries in the European Union have no major
conflict or dispute with their trading partners in the
region.  Issues such as border disputes, access to markets
and resources, and distrust of neighboring states were all
resolved prior to a country’s inclusion into the Union.37
There are minor disagreements on certain issues, such as
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agricultural and transport matters, but no one specific
issue produces a major dispute among the members.
Second, all of the European countries have replaced
their authoritarian governments with a more liberal
democratic system.  There are no authoritarian regimes in
the European Union.  For example, during the 1960s, Greece,
Spain, and Portugal were all under authoritarian regimes
and each applied for membership in the Union.38  However,
fearing and distrusting these governments, the members of
the Union rejected their accession.  With the overthrow of
these regimes and the return of democracy in all three
countries in the 1970s, all were accepted into the Union.39   
The third condition of spillover is that the hegemonic
powers in the trading area desire greater cooperation on
security.  France, Germany, and Great Britain, the
perceived leaders in the Union, all desire greater
cooperation on confronting transnational threats.  For
example, all three countries lead the initiative for the
creation of the European Police Office (Europol) in 1995.40 
This organization’s role is to gather, share, and
distribute information to support the work of national
police forces.  The missions of Europol are to deal with
drug-trafficking, illicit trafficking in radioactive and
nuclear materials, illegal immigration, money laundering,
and organized crime.41  Additionally, France, Germany, and
Great Britain has strongly supported Europol’s missions by
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providing it with valuable resources, capital, and
personnel to help combat these threats.  
Through this case, we can see how economic integration
leads to greater cooperation on security in the European
Union.          
E. INTRODUCTION TO MERCOSUR 
Though not to the extent of the level of economic
integration as seen in the European Union, the second
regional case study that illustrates the linkage between
economic integration and greater cooperation on security is
the trading bloc known as Mercado Comun del Sur, (Common
Market of the South), better known as Mercosur.  Through
increased transnational threats, augmented demands of new
actors and/or the decreased state’s role and power to
provide stability and security, integration has led to
greater cooperation on security in the Southern Cone. 
F. THE ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN SOUTH AMERICA 
The origins of economic integration in South American
can be traced back to the early 1960s with the
establishment of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA).  However, several countries did not offer a
variety of products to the open market and LAFTA did not
come into reality.  In 1980, another attempt for economic
integration took place.  Several South American countries
started the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI)
to integrate their economies.  This attempt of integration
also failed.42  
It was not until 1986, when the two most powerful
countries in the Southern Cone, Brazil and Argentina,
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signed the Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation
(PICE) that integration took place.  This program was
designed to plan, consolidate, and better streamline the
industrial process of specific industries in both
countries.  An additional goal for PICE was to achieve
balanced trade between both countries and to alleviate
fears, on both sides, for possible economic losses.43 
Economic integration, albeit small and extremely slow, had
begun to take root in the Southern Cone.  The positive
economic results stemming from PICE and the worldwide trend
toward globalization led Brazil and Argentina into signing
the Treaty on Integration, Cooperation, and Development in
November 1988.  This treaty expanded trade liberalization
in both countries in all sectors and industries and called
for the establishment of a common market within 10 years.  
A short time later, after this agreement was ratified
by both countries’ congresses in 1989, President Jose
Sarney of Brazil and Argentine President Carlos Saul Menem,
signed the Treaty of Buenos Aires, which formally
established the implementation of a common free market by
1995.  Finally, in 1991, both these countries, as well as
newly democratized Paraguay and Uruguay, signed the Treaty
of Asuncion, and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur)
was established.44  
The change in economic policy from a protectionist and
isolated stance to a free market, wide-ranging trade
liberalization policy was due mainly to the cost/benefit
analysis of free trade and the worldwide effects of
globalization.  Brazil and Argentina came to adopt liberal
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economic policy guidelines, assigning priority to the free
market environment to better foster the most efficiency in
their economies.  Led by the Brazilian and Argentine
governments, Mercosur was an economic and political
initiative to better consolidate their economies as well as
to respond to the worldwide trend towards regional economic
integration.  
G. THE EFFECTS OF MERCOSUR     
In the last 15 years, as a result of Mercosur, the
economies of the Southern Cone countries have become more
intertwined and market-oriented.  Mercosur countries have
increased their overall trade with each other by 200
percent since its implementation in 1991.45  The extent of
privatization of former state-owned enterprises has been
larger in these countries than in any other region of the
world.  This in turn has led to extensive foreign direct
investment in the Southern Cone, mainly from the United
States, Canada, and several European countries.  In fact,
during the last 7 years, FDI in Brazil has increased by
nearly 400 percent.  FDI into Argentina, Paraguay, and
Uruguay also have increased but not nearly as much as in
Brazil.46  These new actors (foreign investors,
multinational corporations, business elites, etc.) have
forced state leaders to place stability and security at the
top of their national priorities or face the possibility of
reduced investment into their country.  With their recent
transition to democracy, liberalized trade, and the
diversion of state resources from security and defense
matters to the attraction of FDI, states were forced to
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cooperate greater with each other to combat the ever-
increasing level of transnational threats associated with
free trade.  In order to continue to reap economic benefits
stemming from free trade, state leaders were forced to
confront these ever-increasing threats multilaterally and
cooperate greater to ensure the stability and security
needed for this trade liberalization environment to thrive
upon.  The Mercosur countries signed accords with each
other to create consultative mechanisms on drug control and
a sub-commission to coordinate antiterrorist activities in
the tri-border areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.47    
Through this integration, Latin American International
Relations theorist Monica Hirst has theorized that Mercosur
countries’ militaries have become less antagonistic to each
other in the Southern Cone and now share the acknowledgment
that the commitment of joint security and defense policies
in the region is essential to the maintenance of democratic
order, stability, and rule of law.  All of these are vital
components to free trade and economic integration.48 
Francisco Rojas Aravena has described this increased
cooperation as a “thick network of contacts and
declarations among professionals in the military
institutions that has led to a series of concrete measures
designed to establish the framework of understanding that
mitigates the perception of immediate threat and prevents
possible elements of surprise.”49  
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Through confidence building measures (CBMs), such as
military visitations, informational exchanges, joint
military exercises and maneuvers, and a military student
exchange program, the Mercosur countries have the reduce
the chances for surprises dramatically.  Additionally, new
security approaches to combat transnational threats are
debated annually in strategy symposiums conducted by
Mercosur senior military staffs.  In fact, in 1997,
Mercosur foreign ministers established the Permanent
Commission for Coordination on Security to better address
mutual security matters such as the increasing levels of
drug traffickers, terrorists, and illegal aliens that
negatively affect a country’s stability and economy.  In
addition, more information, resources, and capital are
being shared amongst the Mercosur countries to better
contain these threats.50
With liberalized trade and economic integration, the
transnational threats of drug trafficking, terrorism, and
illegal migration cannot be solved in isolation anymore. 
To confront these challenges, Latin American countries have
realized that they must overcome age-old rivalries and
perceptions of each other and establish avenues of greater
security cooperation in confronting these challenges. 
Realizing they have fewer state resources to combat these
threats due to the transition to democracy, Mercosur
leaders have cooperated greater in the fields of foreign,
security, and defense policies. 
H. SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN MERCOSUR
Similar to the European Union case study, we see that
in Mercosur economic integration has had a spillover effect
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in cooperative security.  In order for this spillover to
occur, the three conditions of no major dispute/conflict
among the trading partners, democratic regimes in place,
and strong desire by the hegemonic powers for greater
cooperative security have been somewhat met.  We will
examine the condition of no major disputes among the
members first.
The Mercosur countries have resolved all of their
major conflicts and disputes among each other.  The
conflicts that may have pitted one country against another
in the past have now been laid to rest.51  For example, once
the region’s primary competitors for geopolitical
domination, Brazil and Argentina have settled all of their
border disputes and in former Brazilian President Cardoso’s
words, share a “common strategic vision” for the region.52
Other Mercosur countries have followed Brazil and
Argentina’s lead and have also resolved all of their major
disputes and conflicts.  There are still disagreements over
selective issues but nothing that cannot be resolved
peacefully.
Second, all the Mercosur countries are democratic.
There are no authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone. 
Military regimes were succeeded by democratically elected
authorities in Bolivia in 1982, Argentina in 1983, Brazil
and Uruguay in 1985, Chile in 1988, and Paraguay in 1989.53 
Democratic governments have made the transition from a
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protectionist model to a more liberalized trade policy and
have improved diplomatic ties.  This has led to greater
interdependence and integration and has facilitated
improved cooperative security among Mercosur members.  
Third, even though Brazil has signed accords with
their Mercosur partners to combat transnational threats, it
sees no real need for an integrated security policy for
either themselves or the rest of their trading partners. 
As opposed to Great Britain, Germany, and France who desire
greater cooperation on security in the European Union,
Brazil, the perceived hegemonic power, has no desire for a
formal declaration of coordinated security policies. This
has limited the amount of spillover in cooperative security
in the Mercosur countries.  Until Brazil’s mindset is
changed towards security, Mercosur will never experience
the same amount of spillover as seen in the European Union.   
I. SUMMARY
The factors of the increasing level of transnational
threats, pressure from new actors for stability, and the
weakening state role stemming from the free market
environment and democratic reform leads to the process of
spillover in political issues, such as enhanced regional
security.  However, for spillover to fully occur in
cooperative security, the three conditions of no major
conflict/dispute among the members, democratic governments
in place, and strong desire by the hegemonic power(s) for
greater cooperative security must be present.  As seen
through the European Union and Mercosur case studies, the
absence of any of these conditions can prevent further
spillover in political issues, such as greater cooperative
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security.  This can also prevent cooperation in proposed
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IV. LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON REGIONAL
INTEGRATION, COOPERATION, AND SECURITY
Economic integration, free trade, and democratic
reform have led several Latin American countries to pursue
economic and political models that are more integrated and
interdependent with each other.  Fundamental economic
developments and political changes have pushed several
Latin American countries toward greater trade
liberalization, economic integration, and hemispheric
interdependence.  With the demise of military regimes in
Latin America, the region has become less state-centered
and participation by civil society and the consolidation of
democratic institutions have grown steadily since the
1980s.54  Successive multiparty elections have since been
held in all countries in generally peaceful conditions, and
transitions from one elected government to another, often
belonging to a different political party, have taken place.
In addition, many non-governmental groups and grassroots
organizations have emerged and compete with traditional
political parties in organizing societal support for issues
of public interest and in influencing decisions by the
state.55   
This has led to Latin America’s departure from its
failed state-led, inward-oriented economic model to the
convergence towards the region’s economic liberalization
model between respective states and foreign and domestic
business and industry leaders.  All of these factors have
led Latin America to a much more diverse set of foreign and




domestic actors representing new societal pressures and
transnational alliances.56  Economic integration,
privatization and civilian rule have tended to expand the
scope and role of these actors.  With civilian rule, Latin
American countries such as Argentina and Chile support
closer political relations and greater cooperation on
security through integration.  David Pion-Berlin supports
this integration theory:
These (Latin American) countries, which for
decades had pursued protective, mercantilist
policies toward one another, have now opted for
economic openness, and have already reaped
benefits in the form of greater increases in
trade and investment from abroad…the increase in
trade and investment, along with lowering
inflation throughout the region, has given these
countries renewed hope that they can profit from
the economies of scale that integration brings.57
With this model of economic integration, many Latin
American countries are optimistic of having spillover
effects into other realms of policies, such as foreign,
security, and defense issues.  However, before any
spillover effect happens in the security and defense
fields, Brazil, the perceived hegemonic power in the
Southern Cone, must be convinced that greater cooperation
on security is a plan designed through regional economic
integration by all Latin American countries and not just at
the behest of U.S. priorities and desire. 
A. WHY BRAZIL?
Riordan Roett, Thomas E. Skidmore, and Alfred C.
Stepan have argued that if greater cooperation on security
through economic integration is to become a reality in
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South America, Brazil must fully support and advocate this
idea.58  Through its economic power, geographical location,
and its diplomatic role within South America and
international agencies, Brazil is seen as the regional
leader in South America by Latin America as well as the
United States.  Due to these reasons, Brazil has enormous
influence and power in the region.  We will examine
Brazil’s economic power first. 
Political economists see Brazil major economic world
power and is one of the leaders among the free market
countries.  With its economy more than twice as large as
Russia and India and almost as large as China’s, Brazil is
seen as the major economic player in South America, with
over half of the region’s GDP and population.  With
purchasing power of over U.S. $1 trillion in 2001, Brazil
ranked fifth in the world in terms of GDP, only behind the
United States, China, Japan, and Germany.  In addition,
Brazil is seen as the leader of Mercosur and all the
strategic geopolitical and economic attributes its has.59 
With all of these resources, Brazil is seen by many as the
regional leader in the newly democratized and trade
liberalized environment of South America.  
Second, due to its geographic position and size,
Brazil has enormous influence in the region’s foreign and
political affairs.  Brazil dominates South America as the
largest country covering more than 8,511,965 sq kms, twice
as large as the second largest country, Argentina.  Brazil
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also has a population of over 156 million people making it
the second most populous nation in the Western Hemisphere
only behind the United States.  It shares its border with
nine of the 11 South American nations and has realized that
any event or action in one of these other countries, can
and will have a spillover effect in its country.  Brazil
played a major leadership role in settling the January 1995
Ecuador-Peru border dispute by helping to end the fighting
and assisting both countries in pursuing a peaceful
resolution to the conflict.60  Through all these factors,
Brazil is seen by Latin America as the major diplomatic and
political power in the region.  
Third, Brazil has longed played a major diplomatic
role in South American and international affairs.  For
example, it has provided several prominent scientists and
doctors to UN-sponsored relief efforts in and out of South
America.  Brazil has also sent many skilled diplomats to a
myriad of international organizations, such as the
Organization of American States (OAS), World Trade
Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the World Bank to ensure its and Latin American views
are heard.61  Through this participation, Brazil is seen by
many as the key country in South America and one of the
major players on the international scale.  All of these
reasons have led Stephen Robert to advocate, 
If we want to tackle drug problems on a
hemisphere-wide basis, Brazil is the key to
getting that organized.  If we want to sustain
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democracy, it won’t happen if democracy fails in
Brazil…Brazil is the fulcrum…A strategic
relationship with Brazil becomes a strategic
relationship with South America.62 
With Brazil’s influence and geopolitical power in the
region, greater cooperation on issues such as security and
defense can improve only if Brazil fully supports and along
with the rest of Latin America leads this idea of
integration.  Through its economic power, geographical
location, and its diplomatic role within South America and
the international world, Latin America as well as the
United States sees Brazil as the regional leader in South
American and the main component for greater cooperation on
combating the transnational threats associated with free
trade.  
B. BRAZIL’S VIEW OF ITSELF IN THE REGION
With all of its massive geo-economic factors, the
country’s own elites and government leaders believe that
Brazil is destined to have the distinctive leadership role
in the Southern Cone.63  In fact, Rubens Barbosa, the
Brazilian Ambassador to the United States has stated, 
Given its continental dimensions and the strength
of its economy, Brazil should be seen as both the
engine for growth and a magnet for foreign
investment in South America…Brazil has a sense of
national purpose and vision of a better future,
which we are striving to reach sooner rather than
later…Brazil is ready to take on the
responsibilities that arise from its importance
in the region.64 
                    
62 Robert, “A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward
Brazil,” 5.  
63 Nunez, A 21st Century Security Architecture, 21. 
64 Ambassador Rubens Barbosa, Ambassador of Brazil to the United States,
“The United States and Brazil: Strategic Partners or Regional Competitors?” in
Thinking Brazil: A Newsletter of the Brazil at the Wilson Center Project, Issue
2, August 2000, 6.
40
C. BRAZIL’S VIEW ON GREATER REGIONAL COOPERATION
Brazil’s transformation from military to civilian rule
and its ever-increasing economic integration and
liberalization have led the country to greater cooperation
with its hemispheric neighbors in the Southern Cone.  In
fact, in August and September of 2000, Brazilian President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso hosted the first ever South
American Summit in which a wide variety of subjects were
discussed.  Twelve South American Heads of State attended
this summit.  Issues discussed were strengthening
democracy, expanding trade, improving infrastructure
integration, combating drug trafficking and related
transnational threats, and sharing more information in
respect to science and technology.  As Barbosa has stated,
“Organized crime, especially drug trafficking and related
crimes, has become a transnational phenomenon that does not
respect political or moral boundaries.  To increase our
likelihood of success in the fight against it, we must all
strive to increase regional cooperation and coordination,
including information sharing.”65    
Brazil believes that regional economic integration can
lead to greater cooperation on security and defense issues. 
However, every country in South America must have a voice
in this integration process.  By working together in this
process, Latin American countries can enhance their
individual and collective abilities to attain their
national goals.  Brazil realizes that by working together
more closely together on security issues, they and the rest
of Latin America stand a better chance of achieving
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economic prosperity in the ever-increasing globalized
economy.  
D. BRAZIL’S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY
Brazil’s current foreign policy strategy is guided by
two principles.  First, Brazil prefers multilateralism
trade arrangements on account of the diversity of their
market to other parts of the world outside Latin America,
namely the European Union.  Second, the country prefers
sub-regional integration-namely the continuance of
Mercosur-before any perceived U.S.-led hemispheric trade
agreement, such as the FTAA.  Brazil has long been
skeptical of any new U.S. initiative.  Due to past actions
and initiatives, Brazilians have the perception that the
United States has not always been consistent in its
approaches and has not always delivered on promises of
greater engagement and consultation with Latin America on
foreign policy issues.  Brazil also has the fear that any
U.S. led action will weaken Brazil’s status as a regional
hegemonic power.66  According to Thomaz Guedes da Costa,
Brazil, through hemispheric integration and increased
cooperation, will resent the idea that it will be consigned
to regional policing roles while “Big Brother” to the north
takes on the larger and more vital task of overall
hemispheric defense.”67  Brazil, seeing itself as the
hegemonic power in the Southern Cone, does not want or
desire U.S. influence in the area dominating and setting
policy agendas for the region unilaterally which only
serves in the best interest of the United States. 
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E. BRAZIL’S VIEW ON THE FTAA AND THE NEGOTIATIONS 
Brazil favors the implementation of the FTAA but only
if all Latin American countries, not just the United States
acting unilaterally in setting its own agenda in
establishing hemispheric economic integration, are involved
and have a say in the negotiating process.  Additionally,
it favors a free trade arrangement that does not weaken
their international bargaining position with other trading
blocs.  The Brazilian government wants to remain autonomous
in establishing trade arrangements with other trading blocs
and not be locked into a disadvantageous agreement that
they could not escaped from; namely an asymmetric
hemispheric integration position favorable to the United
States and to all of its consequences.68    
Brazil also favors a slower integration into the FTAA
in order to build up its internal industrial sectors before
exposing its industries to the vast FTAA-scale trade
liberalization market.  With this, Brazil would be able to
complete its free market-oriented reforms, upgrade its own
industrial base, and enhance its competitiveness in the
FTAA.  Brazilian business elites and industrial leaders
favor this more deliberate approach in the FTAA
negotiations because it would buy them the time these
specific sectors need to able to build up and compete on
equal terms with their counterparts, particularly those in
the United States and Canada.69  Additionally, this more
deliberate pace in the FTAA negotiations would give them
time to strengthen their individual trade agreements with
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other trading blocs such as the European Union and Andean
Pact and possibly establish closer economic ties with other
countries in the World Trade Organization, such as Russia
and China.70  Through this approach, Brazil would not be
limited just to the FTAA.  Rather, they would still be able
to reap the economic benefits of worldwide trade
liberalization.  
Brazil favors negotiating the FTAA as a single
undertaking using a building bloc methodology based on
negotiations between existing trading blocs, such as
Mercosur, the Andean Pact, and Caricom.  This would give
these smaller countries a much stronger and more solidified
voice in negotiations with the United States on the FTAA.71  
In comparison, the United States prefers country-to-
country negotiations, which undoubtedly would favor them
due to its enormously influential political will and its
vast amount of resources and capital.  Additionally, the
United States favors a “most comprehensive” trade agreement
that encompasses all issues, such as environmental and
labor standards, market access, intellectual property
rights, and government procurement, that would establish
restrictive and concrete FTAA rules and standards along the
same lines as NAFTA.  This is contrary to Brazil’s stance. 
They favor a trade agreement that excludes issues such as
environmental and labor standards and prefers an agreement
more along the lines of Mercosur, where there is a looser
interpretation of the rules, procedures, and standards of
trade between the countries.  Brazil believes that a simple
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series of flexible principles and rules would be the best
way for Latin American countries to establish a true
liberalization of trade and integration.  Each country in
the customs union would bilaterally consult and compromise
with each other to attain the most beneficial outcomes for
both sides.  This approach would not lock Latin American
countries into following a set restrictive and standardized
rules and regulations, largely perceived to be U.S.-
centered, that could deny them into not reaping the maximum
economic benefits available.  
F. BRAZIL’S VIEW ON REGIONAL SECURITY  
Currently, Brazil expresses no great desire for a
hemispheric-wide security force for dealing with
traditional external and internal threats.  However, it
does share the Argentine and Chilean vision of greater
cooperation on regional security through integration with
the rest of Latin America.  With economic integration and
an improved political relationship with Argentina, their
former historical rival, former Brazilian President Cardoso
has stated that both Brazil and Argentina now share a
“common strategic vision” for their respective national
goals.72  With this mindset, many Brazilian troops,
resources, and capital have been shifted from the southern
border of the country to the northern border to confront
and combat the ever-increasing transnational threats of
drug–traffickers, terrorists, and illegal aliens associated
with economic integration and free trade.  To battle these
threats, Brazil has established a new national security
policy that assigns priority to better develop and protect
the border areas, especially in the Amazon and Northeast
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regions of the country.73  Through this, Brazil’s military
has been authorized to display a stronger role in
confronting transnational threats.  For example, the army
is allowed to seek out and destroy cocaine fields and labs
throughout all of the country.  The navy may now intercept
suspected drug boats on inland rivers and along the
Brazilian coastline.  Additionally, the Brazilian Air Force
has been testing a new surveillance system called Sistema
de Vigilancia da Amazonia (SIVAM), designed to monitor and
track suspected drug traffickers, terrorists, and illegal
aliens crossing into Brazil along the northern border. 
This system is being called the “eyes and ears” of the
northern border.74 
However, even with all of these new roles for the
Brazilian military, the government realized that it could
not fight the transnational threats in isolation anymore.
With the free flow of people, goods, capital, and resources
crossing geographical borders, Brazil, as well as the other
Mercosur countries, have multilaterally entered into a
series of security agreements to combat the transnational
threats associated with economic integration and trade
liberalization.  In fact, Brazil has led the way into
signing accords to create permanent consultative mechanisms
on drug control and to establish a sub-commission to
coordinate and combat antiterrorist activities along its
tri-border area with Argentina and Paraguay.75  With these
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accords fostering improved coordination and cooperation
between each country’s interior ministries, police, and
security forces, stronger military to military ties and a
regional security system can optimistically be predicted
for the near future.  However, due to its perceptions of
the United States, Brazil will not establish any security
alliance based solely on U.S.-led proposals or directives
that they believe solely serves U.S. interests.  Brazil
will support a security arrangement based on principles and
goals that are in the best interests of all countries in
Latin America, not just the United States.76  Through its
economic integration with the other Mercosur countries and
its leadership role within the region, Brazil will favor
greater cooperation on security and defense issues that
will ensure the stability and peace needed to continue
their liberalization trade program and economic growth.
G.  SUMMARY
The increasing level of transnational threats,
pressure from new actors for stability, and the weakening
state role stemming from the free market environment and
democratic reform has led to a spillover effect in
establishing more coordinated and joint security strategies
for the problems of drug trafficking, illegal migration,
and terrorism associated with free trade in Latin America.
All the conditions for spillover have been somewhat met in
the region. 
However, in order for Latin America to achieve even
greater cooperative security, as seen in the European
Union, Brazil, the hegemonic power in the Southern Cone,
must fulfill the third condition of spillover (desire by
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the regional hegemonic power for cooperative security). 
For example, Brazil currently sees no enemies that can
threaten their stability.  They see no real need for
regional military alliances with states inside or outside
the region.  Even though Brazil’s views and actions do
support the other two necessary conditions (no major
conflict/dispute among the trading partners and democratic
governments in place) of spillover, until it meets the
third condition, increased cooperative security within the
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V. U.S. VIEWS TO THE FTAA AND COMPARISON WITH
NAFTA 
Many congressional leaders such as Charles Rangel (D-
NY), David Bonior (D-MI), Sharrod Brown (D-OH), and Ted
Strickland (D-OH), have questioned whether economic
integration through the FTAA can lead to enhanced security
in the Western Hemisphere.77  Referring to NAFTA results,
these FTAA opponents point to the fact that the United
States and Mexico have not seen greater cooperation on
security as witnessed in the European Union and Mercosur. 
These congressmen have also questioned the validity of the
economic benefits envisioned by FTAA supporters.  They fear
that NAFTA figures have been greatly exaggerated and that
several small and medium business will be driven out due to
lower Latin American production, manufacture, and labor
costs with the FTAA.78
NAFTA and FTAA supporters point to the relatively
positive economic results of NAFTA in their argument for
the FTAA.  FTAA supporters, such as Robert Zoellick (U.S.
Trade Representative) and Peter Allgeir (U.S. Trade
Representative for the Western Hemisphere), point to the
fact that NAFTA has produced significant U.S. economic
gains and little of the costs alleged by its critics.79 
FTAA supporters envision even greater economic benefits
with an expanded free trade area throughout the hemisphere. 
They feel that through integration and continued democratic
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reform in the region, greater cooperation on combating the
transnational threats associated with free trade will
materialize. This chapter will first examine some of the
economic arguments NAFTA opponents had, which are similar
to the arguments FTAA opponents have, more closely.  It
will argue that all three variables needed for spillover
(no major dispute/conflict among the trading partners,
democratic governments in place, and strong desire by
regional hegemonic power(s) for greater security
cooperation) need to be present in the FTAA if greater
cooperative security in the Western Hemisphere is to be
expected.        
A. COMPARING NAFTA ECONOMIC RESULTS WITH FTAA FEARS 
During the NAFTA negotiations, the significant U.S.
opposition towards free trade came from a coalition of
labor unions, small business owners, and environmentalists.
Labor groups and small business owners feared that their
specific industries and/or businesses stood to lose
enormously economically in free trade competition with
lower-cost Mexican producers, manufacturers and labor. 
Additionally, environmentalists argued that domestic
companies were fleeing strict environmental regulations in
the United States for the more lenient set of standards in
Mexico.  They argued that products grown and produced in
Mexico were not as safe as those produced in the United
States.80  
These fears are similar to what FTAA opponents have
about the proposed FTAA.  FTAA opponents fear that Latin
American imports would flood our markets and thus drive out
US manufacturers.  They fear that the FTAA will destroy
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many U.S. jobs.  In addition, FTAA opponents fear that with
Latin America’s lower environmental standards, many U.S.
companies will relocate their production plants to Latin
America and drive out domestic companies who stay in the
country.81  However, many of the fears NAFTA opponents had
about this trade agreement have been proven wrong.  We will
examine the effects that free trade has had on the
respective economies first.    
B. NAFTA TRADE RESULTS
In 1993, before NAFTA took effect, trade between the
United States and Mexico totaled $81 billion.  In 2000, the
trade between the two countries totaled $247 billion
dollars.  U.S. exports to Mexico soared 167 percent between
1993 and 2000, while U.S. exports to countries outside of
NAFTA grew roughly at a modest one-third of this rate. 
Today, with NAFTA, we export more to Mexico than to our
European allies of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy
combined who are all in the European Union.  In addition,
Mexico traditionally (since 1989) has been our third
largest source of goods imports only behind Canada and
Japan.  Today, Mexico accounts for 14 percent of U.S.
exports and 11 percent of U.S. imports.  This table will
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U.S. Goods Trade with Mexico (in billions of U.S. dollars)

   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

U.S. Exports 41.6 50.8 46.3 56.8 71.4 78.8 86.9 111.3

U.S. Imports 39.9 49.5 62.1 74.3 85.9 94.6 109.7135.9

Table 1.   Effects of NAFTA in Merchandise Trade.
From: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993-1999.82

Two-way trade in agricultural products between the
United States and Mexico has increased 87 percent since the
passage of NAFTA, reaching a total of $11.6 billion in
2000.  This includes a variety of products such as red
meats, processed fruits and vegetables, poultry, fresh
fruits, rice, feeds, and fodder.  This variety of
commodities highlight the variety of benefits NAFTA has had
on U.S. agriculture.  In 2000, Mexico (with imports of $6.5
billion), along with Canada (with imports of 7.6 billion)
purchased over 25 percent of all U.S. agricultural exports. 
As once feared by NAFTA opponents, free trade did not
destroy American agriculture.  In fact, with NAFTA, these
two countries helped sustain the economies of American
farmers.  This table will highlight the effects of NAFTA
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U.S. Agricultural Trade with Mexico (in billions of U.S.
dollars)

   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

U.S. Exports 3.5 4.5 3.5 5.4 5.1 6.1 5.6 6.5

U.S. Imports 2.7 2.9 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.6 4.8 5.1

Table 2.   Effects of NAFTA in Agricultural Trade.
From:  U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993-1999.83

Finally, trade in services with Mexico has also
increased since the passage of NAFTA.  U.S. services
exports to Mexico reached a record $12.5 billion in 1999. 
These sectors include business, professional, technical,
and travel.  In contrast, U.S. services imports from Mexico
slightly decreased in 1999 to $9.8 billion, but were $2.4
billion higher than 1993, before the implementation of
NAFTA in 1994.  Travel accounts for most of U.S. exports of
services to Mexico and for most of U.S. imports of services
from Mexico.  This table will highlight the effects NAFTA
has had in services trade since its passage.  

U.S. Services Trade with Mexico (in billions of U.S.
dollars)

   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 

U.S. Exports………10.5 11.3 8.7 9.4 10.8 11.7 12.5

U.S. Imports………7.4 7.8 7.9 8.9 9.8 9.9 9.8


Table 3.   Effects of NAFTA in Services Trade Since its
Passage.
From:  U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993-1999.84





As it can be seen, NAFTA has not driven out U.S.
manufacturers, as NAFTA opponents had once feared.  Through
these results, FTAA opponents should re-evaluate their
fears of Latin American imports driving out U.S.
manufacturers and producers.  Potentially, U.S. businesses
could reap even greater economic benefits with an even
larger free trade area market, such as the FTAA.   
A second economic fear that some NAFTA opponents had
about this trade agreement was that it would lower U.S.
standards of living because of the perceived trade deficit. 
This is also similar to what FTAA opponents fear about the
proposed FTAA.  However, this fear, too, has been proven
wrong.  According to economic analyst Rich Nadler, who has
reviewed pre- and post-NAFTA growth rates in U.S. standards
of living, the rate in personal wealth has more than
tripled since NAFTA was implemented.  By using a complex
formula that measures inflation-adjusted gross domestic
product (GDP), disposable personal income growth, and
personal consumption, expenditures grew by an inflation-
adjusted 1.76-percent annually between the years of 1994
and 1995 (post-NAFTA years), compared with 0.56 percent a
year from 1990 to 1993 (pre-NAFTA years).85  Through these
results, FTAA opponents should re-examine their fears of
trade deficits driving out US manufacturers and lowering
standards of living.  Potentially, U.S. manufacturers could
reap even greater economic benefits with passage of the
FTAA.
Finally, many NAFTA opponents feared that if NAFTA was
implemented, U.S. manufacturers would be held to a
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disadvantage because of the U.S.’s relatively high
environmental and labor standards.  This is also a fear
that FTAA opponents have about the proposed FTAA.  Many
labor and environmental groups, as well as several members
of Congress and the constituents they serve, fear that the
FTAA would give Latin American countries potentially
greater leverage in challenging the U.S.’s high
environmental and labor standards and attracting more
foreign investment towards them.86  While this fear is still
somewhat valid with the FTAA, U.S. manufacturers have not
been hurt as bad economically as many NAFTA opponents
feared that they would be hurt by NAFTA.  Nevertheless,
many labor and environmental groups are demanding from
their respective Congressmen to ensure that the FTAA will
mandate that Latin American countries raise their labor and
environmental standards to an equivalent U.S. level.87  In
fact, Carolyn Cheney, Chairman of the American Sugar
Alliance and Washington Representative of the Sugar Cane
Growers Cooperative of Florida, has stated, “U.S.
negotiators for the proposed FTAA should ensure that
foreign standards rise to U.S. levels, rather than
providing an advantage to developing countries with
despicable labor and environmental standards.”88  Other
groups support this position.  Thea Lee, former assistant
director for international economics at the public policy
department of the American Federation of Labor and Congress
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of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) has stated in a
statement before Congress, 
Our current trade policy is lopsided: it protects
copyrights, but not workers’ rights.  It takes
care of international investors, but not the
environment.  We are opening markets abroad in
financial services and agriculture, but we are
not taking care of displaced workers at home. 
Let’s get our priorities straight before
launching into yet another round of the wrong
kind of trade liberalization.   The AFL-CIO will
oppose fast track legislation that does not
require enforceable labor and environmental
standards in the core of any new trade agreement. 
Limiting fast track in this way sends the
clearest message possible, both to our own
negotiators and to our trading partners, that we
are ready and willing to chart a new path in the
global economy and that no country should be able
to gain a competitive advantage by sacrificing
its environment and its work force.89
The AFL-CIO seeks an economic and social integrated
trade agreement that recognizes the vast economic
disparities between the United States and the rest of its
hemispheric neighbors.  They also want a trade agreement
that protects the interests of U.S. workers, manufacturers,
and the environment.90  This is an issue still valid for
NAFTA and has a direct impact in the negotiations for the
proposed FTAA.
C. COMPARING SPILLOVER EFFECTS: WHY NAFTA HAS NOT
IMPROVED COOPERATION ON SECURITY SO FAR
In the European Union and Mercosur, all conditions of
spillover are met.  In comparison, NAFTA does not have all
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the necessary conditions for spillover to occur.  Due to
the U.S.’s lack of desire for greater cooperative security
with Mexico, NAFTA has not produced the same results in
security as seen in the European Union and Mercosur.  As
mentioned, the desire for greater cooperation on security
by the hegemonic power, the United States, is one of the
three necessary conditions needed for spillover to occur. 
Even though the two other conditions (no major
dispute/conflict among the trading partners and democratic
governments in place) are present in NAFTA, without the
U.S.’s desire for greater security, improved cooperative
security between Mexico and the United States will not
occur.  
As seen with NAFTA, until the United States fully
desires greater cooperation on security, the FTAA will not
experience the same level of integration and
interdependence as seen in the European Union and Mercosur.
Greater cooperative security will not occur and the United
States and Latin America will have to combat the ever-
increasing transnational threats of drug trafficking,
terrorism, and illegal migration, associated with free
trade, without a formal joint and coordinated policy as

















































A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Economic integration and free trade areas, such as the
proposed FTAA, can have dramatic impacts, not only on the
economies of the United States and Latin America, but on
other political issues, such as security strategies.  
As seen in the European Union and Mercosur, the
increasing level of transnational threats, pressure from
new actors for stability, and the weakening state role
stemming from the free market environment and democratic
reform have led to the process of spillover in establishing
more coordinated joint strategies for the issues of drug
trafficking, illegal migration, and terrorism associated
with economic integration.  However, without the spillover
conditions of no major conflict/dispute among the trading
partners, democratic governments in place, and strong
desire by the hegemonic power(s) for cooperative security,
greater cooperation on security will never happen.  All of
the countries in the European Union, and to a lesser extent
in Mercosur, meet these conditions.
For the FTAA countries to experience this same level
of cooperative security as in the European Union and
Mercosur, all three conditions for spillover must be
present.  Currently, FTAA countries meet two of the three
necessary variables.  There are no major disputes/conflicts
between the members of the trading area that can hinder
cooperation.  Additionally, all the countries in the FTAA
have democratic governments.  There are no authoritarian
regimes in the proposed trading bloc.  However, the third
condition of greater cooperative security by the regional
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hegemonic power(s) for spillover is not present in the
FTAA.  Both the United States and Brazil do not desire
greater cooperation on security through the FTAA.  Both of
these countries only envision the FTAA as an economic
advantage.  Until the U.S. and Brazilian mindset is changed
toward greater cooperative security, increased cooperation
on security through the FTAA will not occur.  All three
conditions of spillover need to be present for FTAA
countries to experience greater cooperative security as
seen in the European Union and Mercosur.             
Comparing these conditions to that in NAFTA, the
United States, the hegemonic power, lacks the desire for
greater cooperative security with Mexico.  The United
States sees NAFTA only as an economic agreement that
produces economic benefits.  Without the U.S.’s desire for
greater cooperation on security, spillover will not occur
and transnational threats will continue to be fought
unilaterally and hinder future economic growth and
democratic reform in the region.  
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Through the FTAA, the United States can generate
increased opportunities for all Americans in the Western
Hemisphere.  With the FTAA, the United States can set trade
policy that will lay the foundation for a post-Cold War
world based on the cornerstones of integration,
cooperation, democracy, and trade liberalization.  In
addition, by implementing the FTAA, the United States can
set a course of stability, security, and peace for the
entire hemisphere.  Not just for a year or two, but for
decades to come.
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The United States must desire greater cooperative
security through the FTAA.  It must see the FTAA as not
only economically beneficial but politically, as well. The
United States also must convince Brazil to desire greater
cooperative security through the FTAA.  Without these two
hegemonic powers’ endorsement on increased cooperative
security, the FTAA will not improve security relations in
the region.  The FTAA will be an agreement that leads to
economic benefits only.  
However, the United States must also exhibit patience
and perseverance in dealing with its Latin American
neighbors in the negotiations for the FTAA.  The Unites
States should not try to push economic integration and
cooperative regional security on Latin America too fast. 
This would only lessen Latin America’s security engagement
and increase the feeling of mistrust of perceived U.S.
intentions.  Rather, the United States must enhance its
hemispheric partners’ confidence in and level of comfort
with U.S. leadership.  It must earn the trust of its
regional partners, especially Brazil, through patient
willingness to listen and work together.  It is also
imperative that the United States continues to encourage
the development of regional state institutional
capabilities, especially for the conversion from
predominantly state-centered to free-market and private
capital economies.  In addition, the United States must
also foster the deepening interactions of the new civil-
military interactions promoted by democracy and economic
integration.  These long-term effects will take time, but
as these groups begin to become more accustomed with each
other, cooperation and compromise will improve.  Through
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patience and perseverance, the United States can foster the
development of stronger relationships within security
institutions in the region as well as the development of
new relationships on a sub-regional and hemispheric basis.  
It is the best interest of the United States,
economically, politically, and socially, to implement the
FTAA.  This trade agreement could bring enormous benefits
in not only economic means, but in the security world, too. 
Transnational issues pose a major threat to the stability
and security of every country in the region.  However, with
the proposed FTAA and the regional economic integration it
brings with it, greater security cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere can be attained.  This will lead to the security
and stability that each country desires.  For a region of
countries that share common borders and economic futures,
this is an opportunity that the United States and Latin
America cannot pass up.  
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